Government? What Government? Or How to Paralyze a Nation for the Sake of a Cozy Job…
Modern public debate in Poland suffers from a chronic ailment: it operates on cognitive shortcuts that we have over time accepted as unassailable facts. In daily media coverage, words like "government," "head of government," or "governing" are thrown around constantly. We have grown accustomed to an intuitive image where the prime minister is a standalone leader possessing autonomous political power—someone whose job is simply to rule over the country.
Yet, whenever the system skids and state institutions begin to block one another, political commentators immediately diagnose a "crisis," "chaos," or "anarchy." We rarely pause to ask whether this state of deadlock is actually the most natural, constitutionally hardwired defense mechanism of the state organism.
To see this, one must look beyond what is immediately visible in television soundbites. It requires examining the precise concepts we have mindlessly replaced with colloquial copies, and the historical lessons from which those concepts were born.
The One-Word Trap
Linguistic engineering profoundly shapes our perception of reality. The word "government" carries an implicit weight of intuitive autonomy. To govern means to impose one’s will, to shape reality at one's own discretion, and to make sovereign decisions about the direction of the community. It is, by definition, a process driven by agency and effectiveness.
The problem is that in the Polish constitutional order... no such body exists.
A careful reading of the 1997 Constitution reveals that the architects of our system did not establish a "government," but rather the Council of Ministers. This terminological shift is not a matter of mere academic orthodoxy. It conceals a fundamental difference between two models of executive power: the difference between governing and managing.
According to Article 10, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the system is based on a strict separation and balance of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. In this system, the government administration is not the sovereign.
Governing implies autonomy. Management, on the other hand, is a process that is inherently derivative and—most importantly—strictly audited. A collegial body like the Council of Ministers holds no original, primary mandate to manufacture legal reality. It is merely a manager tasked with administering a designated area of the state within the strict boundaries and on the basis of statutes passed by parliament. This is explicitly demonstrated by the constitutional principle of legality enshrined in Article 7, which states that public authorities function on the basis and within the limits of the law. A manager does not make the rules of the game; their duty is to ensure they are followed, all under the constant gaze of external overseers.
From Martial Law to the "War at the Top": The Roots of the System
To understand why the Polish Council of Ministers was bound by such rigorous constraints, we must look back to the intentions of the system's architects in the 1990s. Their thinking was shaped by two monumental and starkly contrasting historical experiences.
The first was the fresh memory of martial law and the decrees of Wojciech Jaruzelski’s authoritarian regime. In that system, officials and military officers, acting at the whim of a single ruling party, could reshape the law through cabinet decisions, completely bypassing any real representation of the nation. The authors of the new Constitution knew that the executive apparatus had to be permanently stripped of any power to independently usurp legislative functions.
The second experience was the chaotic early years of the post-communist transition (1989–1997), dominated by the so-called "war at the top" during Lech Wałęsa’s presidency and the operation of the temporary Small Constitution of 1992. The system back then was defined by deeply blurred lines of competence. There were constant clashes between the President and the Prime Minister over control of the key "presidential ministries" (Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and National Defense). President Wałęsa, striving to reinforce his position, frequently resorted to what was dubbed the "falandization of law"—stretching legal interpretations to the absolute limit of their text just to push through personal or political decisions. The prominent, almost pivotal position of the head of state during that era was also reinforced by heavy-hitting personalities; alongside Wałęsa, there was Aleksander Kwaśniewski, whose first term overlapped with the final drafting stages of the Constitution.
The memory of these extremes—on one hand, the unchecked omnipotence of the executive apparatus in the communist era, and on the other, personal turf wars in the early Third Republic—gave birth to a highly rationalized parliamentary-cabinet model. It was designed with a fragmented institutional legitimacy meant to act as a system of circuit breakers:
• A Strict Executive Role: According to Article 146 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers conducts internal and foreign policy and directs the government administration, but its very existence and legitimacy depend entirely on a vote of confidence from the Sejm.
• The President as Chief Auditor: The head of state, chosen in separate, popular elections, was handed powerful tools of oversight—the legislative veto (which requires a qualified 3/5 majority in the Sejm to override) and the right to refer statutory provisions to the Constitutional Tribunal. The President does not rule directly, but stands guard over the continuity of the state and the sovereignty of its procedures.
In this way, a structure was built in which no single political force can instantly and indisputably monopolize the state. A classic example of this is the specific process of appointing constitutional judges or filling other state positions. The system intentionally splits the procedure: one organ selects (e.g., the Sejm), while another administers the oath or signs the nomination (the President). By design, this architecture forces what the preamble to the Constitution calls the "cooperation of powers." It is a profound, modern self-limitation of state structures—a conscious antithesis to feudal systems where the ruler’s will was law itself.
Media to the Rescue! The Great Narrative Inversion of Concepts and Meanings
A turning point in how these roles are perceived occurred around 2005. Hand in hand with rising political polarization, a subtle but incredibly consistent narrative operation began in the public square. Its goal was to shift the center of gravity of power away from the parliamentary-presidential mechanism and onto a purely administrative hub.
As Jan Rokita recalls, after the 2005 elections, the leader of Civic Platform launched a complex political operation aimed at breaking up the looming PO-PiS coalition. He initiated a massive onslaught against the newly elected president, Lech Kaczyński, rallying politicians aspiring to various state roles to the cause. When that same leader assumed the office of Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 2007, telling words began echoing from the new majority camp: that "the president is not needed for anything," and that the veto was nothing more than "obstruction" and "blocking the state." And so it stayed... One wonders what rule or constitutional standard would have been set by media outlets friendly to foreign capital and western financial interests if that prime-minister-turned-streamer had successfully become president back then :), a goal he certainly fought hard for.
The famous disputes of those years—such as who had the right to represent Poland at Brussels summits—were not mere petty squabbles over prestige. They were attempts to narratively and practically detach the government administration from external auditing. Consequently, through the media and political commentary, the figure of a "head of government" was manufactured on the model of chancellor-led systems. The public was conditioned to believe that the prime minister and his cabinet possess an autonomous mandate to overhaul the state, and that institutional safeguards are merely system flaws to be bypassed one way or another.
The Myth of Legal Dualism
The attempt to transform the role of manager into that of an autonomous ruler eventually sparked a deep conceptual crisis at the intersection of domestic and international law. When the government administration, via the Ministry of Justice, attempts to carry out sweeping personnel and procedural changes in the judiciary, it points to international obligations. This includes rulings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) interpreting Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—the provision guaranteeing everyone the right to a trial by a "tribunal established by law."
This line of reasoning relies on Article 91, Paragraph 1 of the Polish Constitution, which states that a ratified international agreement forms part of the domestic legal order and is applied directly. Furthermore, Paragraph 2 indicates that an international agreement ratified with prior consent granted by statute takes precedence over a statute if the statute cannot be reconciled with the agreement. For the government administration, this is deemed sufficient ground to ignore domestic statutory provisions that international courts have flagged as defective.
However, at this precise juncture, the system runs into the resistance of the ultimate circuit breaker, which the Constitutional Tribunal rightfully invokes: Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which explicitly states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Poland. According to Article 188, the Constitutional Tribunal is the sole body authorized to rule on the compliance of international agreements and statutes with the Constitution, and Article 190, Paragraph 1 dictates that judgments of the Tribunal are universally binding and final. Therefore, since the Tribunal issued a ruling stating that the ECHR interpretation applied by the ECtHR is, within a specific scope, incompatible with the Polish Constitution, the debate is legally closed from the perspective of domestic law. No minister or government agency has the right to enforce an international interpretation over the supreme ruling of their own constitutional court. In this sense, Poland is still only a member of the European Union as an autonomous entity—much like Lithuania was in the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—and not a mere administrative subdivision like Greater Poland or Mazovia. Is that really so hard to grasp? :)
Paralysis as a Defense Mechanism
At this point, a crucial question must be asked from the citizen's perspective: what poses a greater threat to our freedoms? Is it a situation where state institutions temporarily freeze, or one where a single branch of power gains absolute dominance over the entire legal architecture? The ideal scenario, from a pure management theory standpoint, would be simple: if the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) notices an institution isn't functioning, financial funding for the people responsible is cut off. But this would have to apply across the board—from the Prime Minister and ministers to the courts and MPs. They would find common ground incredibly fast under those conditions :). Alright, that is just a childish fantasy; in reality, we would end up with a system of back-scratching, winks, and drinking sessions behind closed doors when no one is looking.
From the viewpoint of defensive constitutionalism, an institutional stalemate is not a failure of the system. Paralysis is the moment the state mechanism grinds to a halt under the weight of excessive dominant pressure. It is a warning sign that proportions have been violated, and that the system of checks and balances has tripped like a fuse in an overloaded electrical grid. Deadlock shows that the system stops the moment a single political force tries to impose total dominance by bypassing the safeguards. It is far better for the administrative apparatus to remain in a forced standstill than for it to act completely detached from the formal rules of the game. Because if it does, the entire house burns down along with the wiring.
Constitutional Deadlock: The Midwife of Polish Economic Success
There is a much broader conclusion to be drawn here, one that goes beyond pure legal theory and touches the everyday lives of every citizen. Poland did not experience its rapid growth over recent decades by accident. This unprecedented civilizational leap was made possible precisely because of the structural deadlock built into the state apparatus. The system was designed to keep the natural urge for autocracy—inherent to any ruling power—in check for a long time. While the state administration was forced to focus on finding compromises within the tight corset of oversight, citizens and the economy gained the breathing room of freedom and stability necessary to build prosperity.
There is a striking, direct correlation between abandoning constitutional self-limitation and civilizational regression. One only needs to look at the martial law years—a period of zero, if not negative, economic development, where the administration operated entirely without brakes, maximizing a crisis of scarcity.
What do we see today, as the administration tries to return to a model of autonomous "governing" backed by the police and bureaucratic muscle of the state, as a certain German journalist in Poland advised? For the past few years, we have witnessed an unchecked surge in public debt. Power shortages are popping up on an increasing scale in a state that is still catching up on historical backlogs and the destruction of wars from the 17th through the 20th centuries. There is a drastic lack of flexibility in current manufacturing, driven by high costs and over-regulation.
This desire to exercise power without looking back at internal circuit breakers also erodes our geopolitical agility. Constantly polarizing the country in foreign relations and creating even the illusion of authoritarian rule—enforced by the security apparatus—drastically pushes us toward Eastern standards, toward a destructive "Belarusianization." Such a trajectory automatically nudges us out from under the natural, stable Atlantic umbrella. Yet, it is precisely this umbrella and a fierce commitment to free-market and democratic standards that help us maintain agency in relations with global powers like Russia or China, allowing us to turn that geopolitical business positioning into tangible profits where possible. Today, almost every region in Poland possesses production, manufacturing, and artisanal potential that could immediately replace imported logistics with local production, turning these hubs into regional distribution networks for the entire Central and Eastern European space. This raises the question: is the constitutional paralysis of the state not being intentionally weaponized to deprecate it? A ruthless war over a few judicial seats and state funds, waged by a handful of people using hundreds of intimidated police officers, is not just the height of selfishness—it is outright sabotage of our collective investment projects.
As long as we keep using the colloquial word "government" in our conversations about the state, we subconsciously agree to let a mere manager become an autocratic sovereign. It is time to return to the terms written into the Constitution years ago. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers is not an autonomous head of state. He is the chairman of a managing board, and his every step must face rigorous, uncompromising audit. And if that audit leads to a deadlock? So be it! Elections will come around again anyway. Because in a modern state, no one should have the right to rule without limits—for the sake of our freedom, our economy, and our geopolitical security.